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enactment in 1857 of a statute making refusal to answer or to produce papers
before either House, or one of its committees, a misdemeanor divested Con-
gress of the power to punish for such. His third is that he is not punishable
for contempt, because the obstruction, if any, which he caused to legislative
processes, had been entirely removed and its evil effects undone before the
contempt proceedings were instituted.
The first contention is disproved by the history of the legislative exercise
of the contempt power; the many cases wherein Congress punished for con-
tempt because of bribery or assault are all examples of the fact that Congress
has the power to punish a private citizen for a past and completed act solely
for punishment. 16 The second contention is refuted by In re Chapman,' 7
wherein it was recognized that the purpose of the statute was merely to sup-
plement the power of contempt by providing for additional punishment, and
by the fact that Samuel Houston was indicted, convicted and fined in the
criminal court of the District of Columbia on account of the same assault for
which he was reprimanded by the House.' 8 The third contention is briefly
disposed of by the Court on the ground that it does not affect the question
of jurisdiction or power of the Senate to punish for contempt, but is merely
a factor to be considered with respect to the guilt or innocence of the peti-
tioner and as such is within the province of the Senate.' 9
The most important phase of the principal case and that with which the
Court was most concerned is the power of the Senate (and of legislative
bodies) to punish for contempt as punishment and not for the purpose of
removing an obstruction to the legislative process. As said heretofore, the
contempt power is a necessary and inherent part of the legislative power 20
and may be exercised whenever some function of the legislature has been
obstructed. The fact that the obstruction no longer exists is without legal
significance. 2 1 The House of Commons has punished contumacious witnesses
under circumstances indicating that punishment was the sole object.22 In
view of its historical derivation of the contempt power from that body, it is
only logical that Congress may exercise it to the same extent as the House of
Commons. Further, there is a well established presumption in favor of the
legality and regularity of official action, especially where such action is that
of a coordinate branch of the government. This presuniption is usually rec-
ognized by the courts with respect to the exercise of the contempt powers of
legislative bodies. 23 Thus, the decision in the principal case is a recognition
and an endorsement by the Supreme Court of the exercise of the legislative
power to punish for contempt even though the contumacious act is completed
and the legislative function no longer obstructed.
H. P. C.
Embezzlement-Required Application of Section More Specifically Ap-
plying to the Accused. Appellant was president of a retail music house and
contracted with the H. Sales Co. for it to consign pianos to appellant's com-
16Willis, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1927), 2 Ind.
L. J. 615; Jurney v. MacCracken, Jr. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 408, Notes 4, 5.
17 166 U. S. 661 (1896).
18 Jurney v. MacCracken, Jr. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 410, Note 10.
10jurney v. MacCracken, Jr. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 410.
20 Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926), 74 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 828.
21 Jurney v. MacCracken, Jr. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 408.
22 Jurney v. MacCracken, Jr. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 409, Note 7.
23 Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926), 74 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 815.
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pany. The contract's terms provided for the payment to the consignor of the
consignment value of the pianos, i. e., the invoice price, within a certain time
as well as the retention by the consignee of certain cash payments. Con-
signee was to pay all expenses of the handling of the goods, and to endorse
and transfer to the consignor and guarantee payment of all notes, contracts,
or leases taken. He was also to report to the consignor at the first of each
month all instruments consigned and settled for, in stock, and in possession
of prospective customers. The state subsequently indicted appellant on
counts of grand larceny and embezzlement and he was convicted on the latter
count. The indictment and trial were predicated upon Sec. 2470, Bums'
1926, dealing with embezzlement by "officer, agent, attorney, clerk, servant,
or employee". Held, the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence
and therefore contrary to law, because the facts in the case bring it
clearly within the letter of Sec. 2471, Burns' 1926, applying to embezzlement
by a factor or other persons enumerated therein who converts to his own use
property intrusted or consigned to him, or the proceeds thereof.'
Such a decision presents a very vital problem to public prosecutors. It
is the purpose of this note to ascertain whether or not the court was justified
in feeling bound so to hold. Here we have two sections of the statutes,
under either of which, it is submitted, the appellant's acts may have come.
The question then is, whether the conviction to be sustained, must have been
based on the statute which most specifically applied to the appellant, even
though he is included in the wording of the section used.
The court here, of course, realized that a "factor is in the last analysis an
agent".2 That they are merely one of a species of agents is elementary.3
Yet the court refused to permit a conviction of appellant as an agent in the
light of coexisting statute dealing specifically with embezzlement by factors. 4
To do so, it felt, would nullify the utility of the latter section, and it believed
that it was thus bound to give effect to the various sections of the Indiana laws
on embezzlement. 5 As the rationale of its duty so to maintain the distinction
between these two sections, the court set out the simple and fundamental rule
that in Indiana crimes "are defined and punished by the statutes of the state
and not otherwise". 6 Being so as to* crimes in general, such rule would un-
doubtedly apply to the crime of embezzlement, which is purely statutory
throughout its comparatively short history. 7 It is merely a statutory larceny
created in an apparently bungling attempt to eliminate the trespass element
from the common law offense. Instead of legislating that element out of the
makeup of larceny, the legislative thought turned then, as it does now, to
merely the common instances which it sought to deal with. Those common
instances of theft without a trespass were exemplified at the time by cases of
servants appropriating to their own use money and goods intrusted to them
and such was the specific situation legislated against.. The American states
followed this lead, which is palpably defective. The various legislatures
'have been occupying themselves ever since in putting patches on it to cover
' Robertson v. State (1934), 194 N. E. 887 (Ind.).
2 Robertson v. State (1934), 192 N. E. 887, 888 (Ind.).
SMechem, Outlines of Agency (3d ed. 1923), Sec. 32 and 36; American Law
Institute, Restatement of Agency, Sec. Id.
4 Burns' 1926, sec.:2474; Burns' 1933, sec. 10-1708.
5 In further justification of the court's position, it should be pointed out that the
section dealing with agents (Burns' 1926, sec. 2470; Burns' 1933, sec. 10-1704) differs
considerably in the punishment provided from the section dealing with factors (Bums'
1926, sec. 2474; Burns' 1933, sec. 10-1708).
6 Burns' 1926, sec. 2400; Burns' 1933, sec. 9-2401; Hackney v. State (1857), 8 Ind.
494; Jones v. State (1877), 52 Ind. 229; Beal v. State (1860), 15 Ind. 378.
7 Bishop, Treatise on Criminal Law (9th ed. 1923), Vol. 2, p. 273.
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other situations which might occur, instead of doing the effective thing which
we thus see to have been the true course from the beginning.8 A Delaware
jurist summed up the resultant status of this problem as follows, "Because
the statutes vary so much in their terms, embezzlement is after all what the
particular statute defines it to be. And the offense, so far as it may be pun-
ished by the statute, can -only be committed by the classes of persons enum-
erated, and of the kinds of property designated in the particular statute." O
But do such rules necessitate such results as that in the instant case?
Before answering, it must first be pointed out that this note makes no attempt
to lay the old but quite real ghost concerning variations between allegations
and proof, especially as to embezzlement 10 in view of the preceding para-
graph. However, the question here is not whether the accused came within
the terms of the section alleged to be violated. The concession of the court,
and the authorities on this point, have already been set out. The sole ques-
tion is whether the prosecution of necessity must have been conducted, not
under the statute applying specifically to the accused, but under that section
applying most specifically to him. The point can only be left to the
courts to answer. Legal periodicals and texts dealing with statutory con-
struction and interpretation are devoid of an opinion on this single issue. Of
course, there is the doctrine against variances between allegations and proof ;
but it has already been submitted that no variance exists where the allega-
tion is against an agent and the proof shows him to be a factor. Again
there is the rule concerning strict construction of criminal statutes."- If
an application of this rule is to result in saying that a conviction within the
terms of a certain section cannot be sustained because another section more
specifically deals with the situation, its use in such instances is to be depre-
cated. In fact, twelve states have already repudiated the rule by statute as
a guide for their courts' 2 and although it undoubtedly has the good feature
of protection of the social interest in personal liberty, its spread to reach
decisions which so astound and chagrin laymen should be frowned on.i3
The fact remains, however, that our Indiana court has said that to con-
vict a factor as an agent (even though conceding factors are agents) would
make the section dealing with factors useless. Thus is added additional
onerousness to the prosecutor's duty of bringing justice to bear on
those suspected of questionable anti-social activities. In framing his
indictment and conducting the trial, he must not only be sure that
the statute upon which he is predicating his work, includes the accused
8 Bishop, Treatise on Criminal Law (9th ed. 1923), Vol. 1, sec. 567 (2); Brill,
Cyclopedia of Criminal Law (1922), Vol. 1, p. 855; Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed.
1932), Vol. 2, sec. 1258.
9 Foster v. State (1899), 18 Del 111, 43 Atl. 265, 267. It is to be noted, however,
that the court here deemed the appellant to be an agent within the contemplation of the
statute.
10 State v. Sarlis (1893), 135 Ind. 195, 34 N. E. 1129; People v. Day (1915),
185 Mich. 68, 151 N. W. 640; Hamuel v. State (1838), 5 Mo. 260; Gardner v. State
(1917), 130 Ark. 253, 197 S. W. 23; 12 A. L. R. 597.
"1U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 93; Steel v. State (1866), 26 Ind. 82; Black,
Interpretation of Laws (2d ed. 1911), p. 451; Sutherland, Statutory Construction(1891), p. 457.
12 Arizona, Rev. Code Ariz. (1928), sec. 4477; Arkansas, Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford
and Moses 1921), secs. 9728, 9729; California, Calif. Penal code (Deering 1931),
sec. 4; Kentucky, Ky. Stat. (Carroll 1930), see. 459; Minnesota, Minn. Stat. (Mason
1927), Sec. 9908; Montana, Mont. Rev. Code (Choate 1921), sec. 10710; Nebraska, Neb.
Comp. Stat. (1929), sec. 29-106; New York, N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (McKinney 1917),
c. 39, sec. 21; North Dakota, N. D. Comp. Laws (1913), sec. 9201; Oregon, Ore. Ann.
Code (1930), sec. 14-1043; Texas, Penal Code (1928), art. 7; Utah, Utah Comp. Laws(1917), sec. 7892.
13 32 Mich. L. R. 976.
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within its terms, but also that no other statute applies more specifically
to the accused's particular status. If the courts insist on such position, and
this court did, it remains for the legislature to step in with a needed broaden-
ing of the statutes and elimination of surplusage. The court in the prin-
cipal case feared that permitting a conviction under the general statute would
be nullifying the more specific one. If this is an intihation that were it not for
the presence of the latter section, there would be less judicial difficulty in
trying a factor as an agent, the court is pointing the way to this desired
simplification. If elimination of a section dealing with embezzlement by
factors will facilitate the application of other sections to these acts, why not
eliminate such sections? Of course, if certain ones are removed, others must
be broadened to include whatever additional situations the former might have
covered. It must be remembered that such a need is distinguishable from the
corrollary one for reform of adjective criminal law, concerning which there
has been considerable hue and cry in recent years.14 It is the substantive
law as set out by the necessarily statutory elements of these statutory crimes
with which this deals. The object is to be able to prosecute under the pro-
visions of a statute dealing with a-certain crime without the danger of re-
versal just because this particular phase of the same type of crime is dealt
with more specifically under an entirely separate section of the laws.
The latest excellent and instructive example of the type of remedial legis-
lation suggested is found in the California Penal Code, where an amendment 15
defines the crime of theft as amalgamating the crimes of larceny, embezzle-
ment, false pretenses, and kindred offenses without changing the elements of
the crimes themselves.' 6 Theft is then provided with its usual two degrees, 17
grand' 8 and petty19 with the varying punishments for each.20 Although the
various provisions of the old crimes are still on the books, such as when
certain persons would be guilty of embezzlement 2' the information or indict-
ment may merely charge theft and that will be sufficient allegation that
defendant unlawfully took property of another, 22 regardless of the means or
the character in which he was acting. Of course, it is obvious that the pri-
mary purpose of this legislation in California was to eliminate the necessity
of alleging whether the acts be larceny, embezzlement, or obtaining property
by false pretenses, which legislation incidently would not be amiss in any
jurisdiction. But one can also see its effect as to what is suggested here.
Why not remove as the test of a defendant's guilt whether he was an
employee, agent, innkeeper, factor, or carrier? This can certainly have its
proper place in ascertaining whether one committed the acts alleged, but for
it to be the ultimate test evidences a defect in that part of the substantive
law which is a result of judicial construction. H.A.A.
14 Perkins, Absurdities in Criminal Procedure (1926), 11 Ia. L. R. 297; O'Connor,
Origin and Effect of Technicality Upon American Criminal Procedure (1929), 5 Notre
Dame Law. 22; Oare, Our Antiquated Criminal Procedure (1925), 1 Notre Dame Law.
35; Reynolds, Proposed Reforms of American Criminal Law (1923), 32 Yale L J.
368; Burdick, Criminal Justice in America (1925), 11 A. B. A. J. 510; National Com-
mission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report No. 8, Report of Criminal Pro-
cedure (1931).
15 Calif. Penal Code (Deering 1931), sec. 484 and following annotations.
16 See also Penal Law, sec. "1290, N. Y. Consl. Laws, c. 40 (Laws of 1909, c. 88)
and Mass. Stat. 1899, c. 316, sec. 1 (Mass. Rev. Laws (1902), c. 208, sec. 26).
17 Calif. Penal Code (Deering 1931), sec. 486.
18 Calif. Penal Code (Deering 1931), sec. 487.
19 Calif. Penal Code (Deering 1931), sec. 488.
20 Calif. Penal Code (Deering 1931), secs. 489 and 490..
21 Calif. Penal Code (Deering 1931), secs. 504 to 508, inclusive.
22 Calif. Penal Code (Deering 1931), secs. 950, 951, and 952.
